UIC School of Law

UIC Law Open Access Repository
UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship
12-2019

In Search of the Common Law Inside the Black Female Body, 114
Nw. U.L. Rev. Online 187 (2019)
Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb
UIC School of Law, tmcmur2@uic.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs
Part of the Common Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and
Society Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Teri McMurtry-Chubb, In Search of the Common Law Inside the Black Female Body, 114 Nw. U.L. Rev.
Online 187 (2019)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs/732
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access
Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

Copyright 2019 by Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb
Northwestern University Law Review

Vol. 114

Symposium on Anita Bernstein’s
The Common Law Inside the Female Body
IN SEARCH OF THE COMMON LAW INSIDE
THE BLACK FEMALE BODY
By Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb*

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 187
I. THE CONTRADICTION OF ENSLAVEMENT AND CONDONED SELF-REGARD ............. 189
II. BLACK WOMEN AND THE ENDLESS QUEST FOR NEGATIVE LIBERTY ..................... 190
III. EQUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW, BUT NOT IN THE BLACK FEMALE BODY ........... 193
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 193

INTRODUCTION
Mississippi and Louisiana plantation master Haller Nutt was a shrewd
manager of his acquired property. The owner of over one hundred enslaved
persons by 1843,1 Nutt was meticulous in his management of their health
through various medical directives that he created, compiled, and issued to
his overseers. One such tome, “Directions to in Treatment of the Sick,”
instructed overseers on how to treat various ailments the enslaved suffered,
including those related to enslaved women’s reproductive health.2 Nutt
instructed:
If a woman miscarries, which should never be the case in a well organized
plantation, they should be treated as one that had given birth to a mature child,
but allowed a longer time to stay in the house – kept longer in bed and nursed
more carefully. – When women miscarry there is something wrong – she has

*
Visiting Distinguished Professor of Law, UIC John Marshall Law School; Professor of Law, Mercer
University Walter F. George School of Law. The Author thanks God for all things, her husband Mark
Anthony Chubb for his love and bottomless well of encouragement, Professor Joy Kanwar for
godmothering this piece, and Professor Bridget J. Crawford for all of the opportunities.
1
1843 List of Negroes on Araby Plantation, in RECORDS OF SOUTHERN ANTEBELLUM
PLANTATIONS, microformed on ser. F, pt. I, reel 1, no. 00801, 204–05 (Kenneth Stampp ed., Univ. Publ’ns
of Am. 1986).
2
Directions to in Treatment of the Sick, in RECORDS OF SOUTHERN ANTEBELLUM PLANTATIONS,
microformed on ser. F, pt. I, reel 1, no. 00792, 195 (Kenneth Stampp ed., Univ. Publ’ns of Am. 1986).
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been badly managed – worked improperly – or she has been to blame herself
and should be seriously punished for it when she gets well.
Women should be carefully attended to – and such as are in the family way
should avoid ploughing– and such heavy work as fit only for men – women in
[sic]family way are generally more free from disease than others, and when they
are sick require particular attention – and all that is generally necessary is to
keep their bowels open with castor oil – and sometimes require bleeding, which
is shown by their pulse.
When women complain of too much bleeding, you must attend to them – the
regular and healthy courses [menses] last about one week – Enquire how long
it has continued on her . . . .3

The women who were the subject of Nutt’s prescribed care were his
property. They were valuable for both their physical and reproductive labor,
the latter more valuable as indicated by his admonition that enslaved women
avoid plowing and other labor-intensive “men’s work” when they were “in
the family way.” Nutt’s directives pertain directly to “female sexual and
reproductive anatomy as it relates to what individuals experience, focusing
on liberties and prerogatives recognized by the law”4—the very definition of
autonomy that is the subject of Professor Anita Bernstein’s impressive and
expansive book, The Common Law Inside the Female Body.5
Bernstein is aware of the legacy of slavery in this country, but her
present account does not consider the different ways in which the common
law historically resided (and continues to reside) in the Black female body.
In slavery, the Black female body had no liberty or prerogatives recognized
by the law. Bernstein writes:
Overall I find myself struck more by the differences, the disanalogy as it were,
between oppression of persons brought to the American continent in chains
from Africa and their descendants, on one hand, and oppression of women in
the United States on the other, than the similarities. Unjust deprivations of
fundamental rights—to vote, sue, own property, enter into contracts, and choose
one’s employer and employment—certainly did connect otherwise different
antebellum experiences, but this book has enough to report and assess without
turning the enormity of slavery into a collateral topic.6

Bernstein goes on to briefly explore, in about two and a half pages,
some “parallels between slavery and [the doctrine of] coverture as they relate

3
4
5
6
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to the common law inside the female body.”7 She makes clear that her work
will grapple almost exclusively with the contradiction of coverture and the
concept of “condoned self-regard,” the ability to put oneself first, as a
foundational tenet of common law.8 A key problem with this approach,
however, is that enslaved persons were not genderless. Populations of
enslaved women resided in the United States under the oppression of brutal
slave regimes. Enslaved women, Black women, were deprived of the
fundamental right to possess themselves because they were the property of
slave mistresses and masters. Perhaps most importantly, the doctrine of
coverture (espoused by William Blackstone and interpreted and expanded by
judges)9 was part of a larger common law paradigm for family governance
of which the plantation was necessarily a part.
I.

THE CONTRADICTION OF ENSLAVEMENT AND CONDONED SELFREGARD

Sir William Blackstone, Bernstein’s appointed spokesman for the
common law in The Common Law Inside the Female Body,10 posited the
existence of three overarching categories of private relationships: master and
servant; husband and wife; and parent and child (inclusive of guardian and
ward).11 In his chapter on the relationship between master and servant,
Blackstone explained that a slave becomes free the moment he arrives in
England with the protections of the law, except when a master has already
acquired the slave by contract.12
Blackstone’s descriptions of master and servant make any condoned
self-regard an enslaved person possessed subservient to her master’s by
virtue of the “contract” between them. Although Blackstone’s language
generated enough ambiguity about the nature of slavery and freedom to
support litigation in English and colonial courts, judges would not stop the
institution of slavery, even as Blackstone’s words arguably incubated the
seeds of abolitionism to grow.13 Capitalism, it seems, was the organizing
7

Id. at 25–27.
Id. at 8, 21, 27.
9
Id. at 19.
10
Id. at 81.
11
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 272 (Wilfrid Prest ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2016).
12
Id. at 273 (“Yet, with regard to any right which the master [] may have acquired, by contract or
the like, to the perpetual service of John or Thomas, this will remain exactly in the same state as
before . . . .”).
13
See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the
Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86, 87–88 (1974) (arguing that the Court’s decision in
Somerset v. Stewart, which questioned the legality of slavery in England and its colonies, highlights the
tension between the common law of slavery and the promise of liberty).
8
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structure for the operation of the common law, a force that devoured
England’s abhorrence of slavery at home and in its colonies. A common law
of slavery, judicially made and socially condoned—law common to the
inhabitants of what would become the United States and cobbled together by
custom and judges—did evolve to protect an economy dependent on the
physical and reproductive labor of the African enslaved.14
Bernstein’s focus on individualist ideals makes condoned self-regard
the centerpiece for how she understands the common law in the female body.
Individualism historically links to capitalist principles. As law and
economics scholar Svetozar Pejovich argues in Capitalism and the Rule of
Law: The Case for Common Law, elevating the individual above the group
(for what else is condoned self-regard?) encourages the individual to take
responsibility for themselves, and to act in their own interests with
autonomy.15 This “culture of individualism” is the lynchpin of a free market
economy.16 Capitalism “require[s] a set of formal institutions strong enough
to secure individual liberties, enforce private property rights, create
incentives to reduce the transaction costs of exchange and maintain
competitive markets.”17 The common law, as a part of the constellation of
formal institutions and rules that maintain the culture of individualism,
protects “individual freedom, free exchange, and private property rights.”18
The common law is effective because it responds to changing economic
conditions. 19 Capitalism materializes in the common law of slavery—law
that was responsive to the labor needs of an imperialist nation. “Fellowfeeling,”20 a way to understand another person’s harm, an understanding
integral to Bernstein’s operation of the common law, cannot redeem it.
Capitalism wrapped its common law arms around slave masters’ and
mistresses’ condoned self-regard. Leaving the Black female body
vulnerable, capitalism created for them a property interest in her person.
II. BLACK WOMEN AND THE ENDLESS QUEST FOR NEGATIVE LIBERTY
Bernstein’s understanding of the common law “inside the female body”
includes the concept of negative liberty: “a right to refuse and reject”
14
William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1711, 1776–80 (1996).
15
Svetozar Pejovich, Capitalism and the Rule of Law: The Case for Common Law, XV
ENTREPRENEURIAL ECON. 7, 8 (2008), https://www.udg.edu.me/post/files/download/1279811417_9536
.pdf#page=7 [https://perma.cc/BB35-Q4WP].
16
Id.
17
Id. at 9.
18
Id. at 12.
19
Id.
20
BERNSTEIN, supra note 4 at 34.
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unwanted intrusions.21 She draws from philosopher John Locke’s theories on
how a person acquires property ownership, namely by combining labor with
“an object” to make it his own.22 Bernstein goes on to explain that property
interests reside inside the female body, absent external exertions, in its
reproductive organs and their abilities.23 She uses this theory to support her
claims that female and male personhood are equal.24 In her words, “gender
hierarchy is now external to the common law in the United States and so, in
a legal system that treats women the same as men at a formal level, a person
with a female body holds those rights to negative liberty that the common
law furnishes to everyone.”25 However, enslaved women did not enjoy
property rights inside of their female bodies. They did not have the legal
authority to exclude slave masters’ unwanted intrusions inside their person.
Slave owners contributed their sperm to fertilize Black women’s eggs and
used Black women’s labor to create a property interest in her children—a
textbook application of Locke’s theories on property. For this reason,
Bernstein’s assertion that Lockean property ownership theory is consistent
with the premise that adult women are persons not subservient to men is
complicated by the lived experiences of enslaved women. Gender hierarchy
may be external to the common law, but patriarchy, white supremacy,
capitalism, and imperialism are not.
With negative liberty comes a list of what Bernstein calls “Do Not
Wants.”26 These negative liberties are: “Physical Trauma at the Hands of
Another”27; “Invasions of the Interests We Think We Have in Land”28;
“Confinement”29; “Encounters That We Perceive as Hurtful to Our Dignity
or Tranquility”30; “Losses or Takings of Chattels”31; “Paying Money for
Something That Does Not Please Us”32; “Being Told to Do Something in
Furtherance of an Agenda We Don’t Share”33; and “marital rape.”34 Women’s

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 33–55, 75–112.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 87.
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right to say what they “Do Not Want” is nullified by voluntariness35;
“consent”36; “undertaking”37; punishment for crimes38; and nominal
injuries.39 Each of these actions and abstentions are racialized and gendered
in the common law.
Black women’s exercise of negative liberty is ever adapting to the
evolving historical ripples caused by slavery and Jim Crow. Ask Sandra
Bland if the violence she suffered by a police officer after he ordered her to
exit her personal vehicle during a routine traffic stop was physical trauma.40
Ask her if her response when the officer demanded she put down her
phone—“I’m not on the phone. I have a right to record. This is my
property”—entitled her to condoned self-regard as she asserted her property
rights.41 Ask Ida B. Wells if her removal from a public rail car in 1884 for
daring to sit in the ladies car was an affront to her dignity and tranquility.42
Ask the members of the Black women’s book club “Sistahs on the Reading
Edge,” all of them removed from the Napa Valley Wine Train in 2015 for
disturbing White passengers, the same.43 Ask Ruby Bridges if her consent to
integrate her New Orleans elementary school at six years old gave her White
classmates and their parents permission to spit on her, throw things at her,
and otherwise inflict her with harm.44 Ask any Black woman whether they
have been subject to the list of “Do Not Wants,” and the answer certainly
will be yes. A nuanced picture of the obstacles to Black women’s exercise
of negative liberties must take into account that their very bodies—encoded
by race, class, gender, and sexuality—are often taken as evidence of consent
to the “Do Not Wants,” as volunteering for abuse, and deserving
criminalization. Black women’s injuries are not nominal; Bernstein would
agree. Accordingly, the function, role, and value of the common law inside
the female body may depend on the relationship of that body to white
supremacy, capitalism, and imperialism in social and historical context.

35

Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
37
Id. at 61.
38
Id. at 66.
39
Id. at 71.
40
Paul J. Weber & Clarice Silber, Sandra Bland’s Own Video of 2015 Texas Traffic Stop Surfaces,
ASSOC. PRESS (May 7, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/1a92859cc6d54b0bb23dc1b6a6e30e36
[https://perma.cc/N8Q6-R9G3].
41
Id.
42
Chesapeake, Ohio & Sw. R.R. Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613, 613 (1887).
43
Complaint at ¶ 32–47, Johnson v. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 2015 WL 5768562 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2015) (No. 15-cv-04515).
44
See generally RUBY BRIDGES, THROUGH MY EYES (1999).
36
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III. EQUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW, BUT NOT IN THE BLACK FEMALE
BODY
In The Common Law Inside the Female Body, Bernstein argues that
formal equality for women began with racial equality for African
Americans.45 Yet the implicit timeline is confusing. The Author fixes the
beginning of formal equality for women in the mid-nineteenth century push
for married women to own and control their property—for such control is
the centerpiece of legal personhood in the common law.46 While married
women’s ability to own property did give them increased wealth and
autonomy,47 much of this wealth and autonomy came at the expense of
enslaved women. As a preliminary matter, marriage in the nineteenth century
was not a choice or right for all, but a privilege primarily reserved for White
people.48 Slave marriages were not legally recognized, which left enslaved
women, men, and children subject to separation or worse, depending on the
economic needs of their masters and mistresses.49 Slavery was alive and well
in the antebellum Americas. As historian Stephanie E. Jones-Rogers argues
in They Were Her Property: White Women as Slave Owners in the American
South, White women were active participants in slavery and benefitted from
it financially, as they were more likely to inherit enslaved persons than real
property.50 For many White, wealthy women, the centerpiece of their legal
identity under the common law was the autonomy they received from
owning and controlling Black female bodies. In the post-Emancipation and
Jim Crow eras, in the Civil Rights Era, and in the age of #MeToo, the
ownership rights to what lies inside the Black female body remain contested.
CONCLUSION
As scholars engage Professor Bernstein and her perspective on the
common law, they must continue to wrestle with its antithetical approaches
to slavery and freedom—especially when the common law “freedom” is the
45
BERNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 89 (citing Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on Equality and
Gender Discrimination in Employment: 1971–2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 501, 520 (2004)).
46
BERNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 96–98.
47
Id. at 98.
48
Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, “Burn This Bitch Down!”: Mike Brown, Emmett Till, and the Gendered
Politics of Black Parenthood, 17 NEV. L.J. 619, 622–24 (2017); Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 119, 119–36 (Kathryn M. Stanchi et al. eds., 2016).
49
McMurtry-Chubb, “Burn This Bitch Down,” supra note 48. See generally TERA W. HUNTER,
BOUND IN WEDLOCK: SLAVE AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2017).
50
STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS SLAVE OWNERS
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH xi–xvii (2019). The focus of Dr. Jones-Rogers’ study is on married women
who owned slaves. Id.
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right to put oneself first. If, as Bernstein argues, the common law inside the
female body encompasses “freedom from much more than freedom to,”51
then a change in perspective is warranted for the common law inside an
enslaved Black female body held as property, raped, and bred at the whim of
slave masters and mistresses, with no control over the children she birthed.
This history invites inquiry into what common law can reside in the modern
Black female body for which the promise of formal equality remains elusive.
The search for the common law inside the Black female body begins a search
for a fuller, deeper, richer understanding of the common law as it affects us
all.

51

194

BERNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 7 (emphasis in original).

